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Abstract
This paper analyses the anti-reductionist argument from renormalisa-
tion group explanations of universality, and shows how it can be rebutted
if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counter-
factual dependence account of explanation.
1 Introduction: The anti-reductionist challenge
Statistical and condensed matter physics have always been a rich source for anti-
reductionist arguments. One prominent anti-reductionist argument turns on the
theoretical role played by innite limits, such as the thermodynamic and con-
tinuum limits, in the context of renormalization group (RG) explanations. Anti-
reductionists have appealed to RG explanations of, e.g., the occurrence of phase
transitions and the universality of critical exponents. They have argued that the
indispensable explanatory usage of continuum limits in these explanations speaks
against reductionism, because such usage reveals a signicant limitation of a more
fundamental reductive theory that describes the atomic constituents of ultimately
nite (albeit micro-physically absolutely huge) bits of matter. (Batterman 2000,
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2002a, 2010, 2011, 2015; Morrison 2012, 2015) In particular, anti-reductionists have
pointed to the indispensable explanatory role of the xed points of renormalization
group transformations. These xed points presuppose limit assumptions that are
arguably in tension with reductionism. (Menon and Callender (2013, 197) nicely
summarize : “The xed point only appears when the system has no characteristic
length scale. This is why the innite particle limit is crucial for the renormaliza-
tion group approach.") Thus, taken at face value, the xed points (incorporating
such limit assumptions) contradict the niteness of the physical systems exhibit-
ing universality – a niteness that is assumed by the fundamental physical theory
to which reductionists allude. The upshot is that the explanatory indispensability
of these xed points is thus seen to reveal a philosophically signicant limitation
of a more fundamental theory.
Let us call the anti-reductionist argument sketched above “the argument from
innite limits". This argument can be seen to underwrite a specic challenge for
the reductionists:
Anti-reductionist Challenge: The reductionists ought to show how the xed
points involved in RG explanations of critical phenomena can be (a) ex-
planatorily indispensable and, at the same time, (b) compatible with reduc-
tionism.
Our main goal in this paper is to show how a reductionist can meet this chal-
lenge. We will assume for the sake of the argument that xed points (and the
presupposed limit assumptions) are indeed indispensable for RG explanations of
universality. By making this assumption we will try to make the strongest pos-
sible case for anti-reductionism. Notwithstanding this assumption, we will argue
that the supposed indispensability does not lead to any ontological commitments
threatening reductionism. We will do so by arguing that a particular account of
explanation – the counterfactual dependence account – captures the explanatory
character of RG explanations, and that in the light of this understanding of RG
explanations the indispensability of xed points is not ontologically committing.
Our response to the anti-reductionist challenge addresses two clear lacunae
with regard to the recent debate.
The rst lacuna is that the reductionist analyses of the innite limits (in-
cluding the xed-points of RG transformations) have focused on explanations
of the occurrence of phase transitions (see for instance, Earman 2004; Buttereld
2011a, 2011b; Norton 2012; Menon and Callender 2013). These analyses do not
2
address one of the key points emphasised by the anti-reductionists: namely, the
idea that reductionists cannot capture RG explanations of universality of macro-
behaviour of physical systems undergoing (second-order) phase-transitions. (Bat-
terman 2015, for instance, points this out forcefully.)1 To address the rst lacuna,
we focus on meeting the anti-reductionist challenge with respect to the RG ex-
planation of universality.
The second lacuna concerns the fact that relatively little work has been done
to explicate the explanatory character of RG explanations of universality. On the
one hand, the reductionists’ focus has been on inter-theoretic reduction relations
(mostly framed as neo-Nagelian reduction). RG explanations, insofar as these
have been discussed at all, have been portrayed – without much of an argument
– in terms of the deductive-nomological (DN) account of explanations, as betting
a Nagelian approach to reduction (Buttereld 2011, Norton 2012). Portraying RG
explanations as exemplifying the DN-model is a controversial and somewhat sur-
prising claim, since most philosophers of science today agree that the DN account
of scientic explanation is deeply problematic. So regarding it as an adequate ex-
plication of a particular scientic explanation requires a good rationale.
On the other hand, although the anti-reductionists do not advocate the cov-
ering law account, they have not provided a convincing philosophical account of
RG explanations either. Most prominently, Batterman has advocated a ‘minimal
models’ account according to which RG explanations are explanatory (roughly)
by virtue of showing that the explanandum is completely independent of all micro-
details (Batterman 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Batterman and Rice 2014). However, this
approach faces serious objections (that are independent of the problems of the
DN-model) and we do not regard it as convincing (see Lange 2015; Reutlinger
2017a; see also Jansson and Saatsi forthcoming).
In eort to address the second lacuna, we will explicate the explanatory char-
acter of the RG explanation of universality in relation to the counterfactual de-
pendence account of explanation.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the (anti-)reductionism
debate surrounding RG xed points. In particular, we highlight a connection be-
tween the anti-reductionist argument from innite limits and explanatory indis-
pensability arguments. In Section 3, we clarify the explanandum at stake, empha-
sising the theoretical context of physics of critical phenomena that preceded the
1Exceptions: Reutlinger (2016, 2017a,b) and Hüttemann et al. (2015) address the explanandum
of universality. The present paper builds on this line of work.
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RG analysis. In Section 4, we provide a detailed exposition of the relevant physics
of RG explanans and the role of xed points (§4.1), and we argue that the counter-
factual dependence account of scientic explanations captures RG explanations
of universality (§4.2). In Section 5, we respond to the anti-reductionist challenge
on the basis of the results of Section 4: we argue that the explanatory appeal to
xed points and limits is (merely) instrumentally indispensable and, therefore, it
does not lead to an ontological commitment threatening reductionism. In the end
we also discuss the limitations of our argument vis-à-vis explanatory (as opposed
to ontological) anti-reductionism.
2 Anti-reductionismandExplanatory Indispensability
Let us now examine the structure of the argument from innite limits more closely.
The anti-reductionists suggest that RG explanations undermine reductionism
due to commitment to the xed points of renormalization group transformations
(and the presupposed limit assumptions). These are often said to ‘control’ critical
phenomena, the universality of which is said to ‘rely on the existence’ of xed
points. The following passage from a leading text book is typical:
Since [the behaviour of correlation functions] depends only on the
xed-point Hamiltonian, the correlation functions corresponding to
all Hamiltonians that converge after RG transformations toward the
same xed point, have the same critical behaviour. Such a universal-
ity property thus divides the space of Hamiltonians into universality
classes. Universality, beyond the quasi-Gaussian approximation, re-
lies on the existence of large-distance (IR) xed points of the RG in the
space of Hamiltonians. (Zinn-Justin 2007, 226. Our emphasis).
Indeed, the RG framework is, in a sense, all about the xed points of RG trans-
formations: their properties, their classication, and the conditions under which
they exist. In as far as this framework furnishes genuine explanations of criti-
cal phenomena that turns on these xed points and their properties, and insofar
as these xed points involve limits of modelling parameters that transcend the
nitude associated with the more fundamental theory, there is a clear prima facie
challenge to reductionism here.
Batterman argues in this spirit that ‘there are very good reasons to deny that
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[critical] phenomena are reducible to “fundamental” theory’ (2011, 1034).2
The renormalization group explains the universal behavior at criti-
cality essentially by exploiting the divergence (blow up to innity)
of the correlation length. [. . . ] Most crucial to the renormalization
group explanation is, as noted, the ineliminable appeal to the ther-
modynamic limit and to the singularities that emerge in that limit.
(2011, 1043)
The sense of anti-reductionism that Batterman supports by pointing to the
explanatory indispensability of the xed points primarily concerns explanation,
not ontology. (The ‘fundamental’ theory, Batterman explicitly says, “gets the on-
tology of blobs of gases and uids right” (2011, 1034).)
The step from ‘explanatory indispensability’ to ontology is relatively short,
however, and various philosophers are willing to take it. This willingness can
be rooted, in general, in a venerable tradition in the philosophy of science that
associates scientic realists’ ontological commitments tightly to explanatory in-
dispensability. Thus, Psillos (2011), for instance, follows Sellars (1963) in adopting
an ‘explanatory criterion of reality’, according to which “something is real if its
positing plays an indispensable role in the explanation of well-founded phenom-
ena.” (Psillos, 2011, p. 15) More generally, philosophers in the Quinean and Put-
namian tradition have argued for realist commitment to mathematical and other
abstracta on the basis of their explanatory indispensability to our best theories of
empirical phenomena (see e.g. Baker and Colyvan 2011).
Morrison (2012, 2015) has defended ontological anti-reductionism in this spirit
– both in general, and with respect to RG xed-points especially. Regarding ‘the
explanatory power of xed points’, in particular, Morrison argues that the reduc-
tionists “ignore a crucial feature of emergence, specically the ability to properly
explain universal behaviour and [. . . ] the role of RG in that context.” (2015,110)
Namely:
The calculation of values for critical indices and the cooperative be-
haviour dened in terms of xed points is the foundation of univer-
sality. RG is the only means possible for explaining that behaviour;
2Batterman puts the term ‘fundamental’ in scare quotes, because he regards it as ambiguous: “a
theory may be fundamental in that it properly characterizes the detailed constitution of the systems
it studies, but can fail to be fundamental in its ability to explain and provide understanding of the
systems it correctly describes.” (Ibid.)
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what happens at niteN is, in many ways, irrelevant. Finite systems
can be near the xed point in the RG space and linearization around
a xed point will certainly tell you about nite systems, but the xed
point itself requires the limit. (Ibid.).3
Turning now to the reductionists, the indispensability of RG xed points is
not by any means denied by them; rather, the issue concerns their status as (non-
)representational elements of the less fundamental theory. Thus, Norton (2012,
222), for example, characterizes them as “points in a diagram: mathematical pegs
on which to hang limit properties.” Norton draws an apt distinction between a
meaningful and well-dened limit of a sequence of systems, on the one hand, and
a limit of a sequence of properties, on the other. The crux of the distinction is
that the latter may not correspond to any possible system, in which case it cannot
function as an ‘idealisation’, but at best as a useful ‘approximation’. According to
Norton, RG xed points are such approximations, for they “do not arise from an
investigation of the properties of innite limit systems. They are not idealizations”
(Ibid.).
However, regardless of its status as an ‘idealisation’ or ‘approximation’, an
anti-reductionist may respond that the very fact that a mathematical limit that
plays an indispensable explanatory role is still puzzling from the point of view
of the more fundamental theory. Why is the use of such limits indispensable
for explaining the phenomena? Why doesn’t the indispensability of such limits
indicate a feature of critical phenomena that transcends the ontology of the more
fundamental theory?
Moreover, problems arise for Norton regarding his construal of an RG expla-
nation as a covering law explanation (viz. DN-explanation):
“Renormalization group methods take the theoretical framework of
statistical mechanics as the covering law. They select as the particular
conditions a broad class of Hamiltonians pertinent to the materials.
They then derive universality under conditions close to criticality.
The renormalization group analysis simply is a covering law expla-
nation.” (2012, 227)
There are two diculties with Norton’s appeal to the DN-model here: rst, re-
garding the DN-model’s assumption that the explanans statements are (approxi-
mately) true, and secondly, regarding general objections to the DN-model.
3See also Morrison (2012).
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The DN-model, as formulated by Hempel and Oppenheim, incorporates the
truth requirement according to which the explanans of an actual explanation must
be true (otherwise we have at best a potential explanation). If the RG explanans
involves an ineliminable appeal to limits, how is this compatible with the truth re-
quirement, since it is not literally true that, for instance, the number of molecules
in an actual gas is innite (as per thermodynamic limit)? One could try to argue
in response (as one referee suggested) that assumptions about the relevant limits
in the context of RG explanations, while not literally true, are nevertheless ap-
proximately true in some sense. Admittedly there is a certain amount of leeway
in the truth requirement: approximately true explanans can also support actual
explanations. And, indeed, it seems reasonable to relax the truth requirement
from literal truth to approximate truth, because demanding that all explanantia
are true simpliciter would render all of known physics outright non-explanatory.
But this raises the question of how to make sense of the innite limits in the RG
explanation as being ‘approximately true’ with respect to nite systems.
It is far from clear, in particular, how the indispensability of these limits meshes
with the DN-model. From the perspective of the DN-model it is natural to expect,
as Hempel (1962) does, that explanations improve if the explanantia are closer to
the truth, and this is what happens in the case of de-idealizable ‘Galilean’ idealisa-
tions, of course. (For example, an explanatory deduction that truthfully incorpo-
rates a small but non-vanishing friction term may be more cumbersome, but such
de-idealization improves predictive accuracy and, if anything, also provides for
a better explanation.) Providing a sense in which approximately true explanans
can underwrite actual explanations hinges on the availability of this kind of story
of how the approximations involved are, strictly speaking, not indispensable for
deducing the explanandum. And arguably this kind of story is not forthcoming
in the case of RG explanations.
So, although we deem Norton’s approximation/idealisation distinction justi-
ed and appropriate in relation to the RG xed points, it does not in and of itself
fully respond to the Anti-Reductionist Challenge. The sense in which the xed
points of the RG explanation are merely instrumental ‘mathematical pegs’ needs
to be further elucidated, with reference to an appropriate understanding of the na-
ture of the RG explanation. Norton’s suggestion to regard the RG explanation as
a covering law explanation is problematic, not only for the reasons given, but also
due to the more generic criticisms of the DN-model. Hempel identies explana-
tory understanding with nomic expectability (provided by a suitable inductive or
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deductive argument), but well-known, extended critiques of the DN-model have
shown that the provision of nomic expectability is neither necessary nor sucient
for having an explanation (e.g. Salmon 1989, 46–50). Consequently it is increas-
ingly popular to identify explanatory understanding with knowledge of explana-
tory dependence relations that are taken to dier from nomic expectability, even
in cases that are structurally similar to DN-deductions (Woodward 2003, Strevens
2008). These prominent viewpoints challenge the DN-model on rather general
grounds in a way that really puts the onus on those who insist that the DN-model
is nevertheless appropriate in the specic context of RG explanations.
In a spirit similar to Norton, Menon and Callender (2013) admit that RG xed
points are an indispensable part of the explanatory resources needed to account
for critical phenomena, and also that xed points transcend the representational
resources of the more fundamental, nite, reducing theory. Yet they go on to sug-
gest that we can account in reductive terms for why the explanatory appeal to
xed points is warranted. Their discussion makes little connection with physi-
cists’ explanations of universality, however, and they oer no analysis of the na-
ture of physicists’ RG explanations. Their account thus unfortunately leaves open
the indispensable role that RG xed points play in actual scientic accounts of
universality, and exactly why this role can be regarded as ontologically innocu-
ous. These issues that are not addressed by Menon and Callender are precisely
the target of this paper.4
4More specically, Menon and Callender point to nite-size crossover theory as explaining why
a particular nite system can be treated as an innite system, indicating that it is very dicult or
perhaps impossible to empirically distinguish between a system owing to the critical point, as
opposed to owing close to it. Regarding the indispensable use of innite limits in explanations of
universality, they summarise their argument:
“When we try to explain the universality of critical behavior in nite systems, we
do have to employ the innite idealization, but as we have seen, this idealization
is not irreducible if we can use the topological structure of system space in our re-
ductive explanation. We can de-idealize for particular systems, and see why they
can be treated as if they ow to the critical point. Understanding the behavior of
innite systems is crucial to explaining the behavior of nite systems, since we only
get the xed points by examining the behavior of innite systems, but this in it-
self does not imply emergence. We agree with Batterman (2011) that mathematical
singularities in the renormalization group method are information sources, not in-
formation sinks. We disagree with his contention that the renormalization group
explanation requires the innite idealization, and is thus emergent. It requires con-
sideration of the behavior of innite systems, but it does not require us to idealize
any nite system as an innite system. Any actual innite idealizations in a renor-
malization group explanation can be de-idealized using nite-size cross-over theory.
Locating xed points does not require an innite idealization, it just requires that
our microscopic theory can talk about innite systems, and indeed it can.” (2013,
221-2)
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There are also some other insightful reductionist commentaries on the theo-
retical role of xed points in the RG analysis of critical phenomena, but we nd
these similarly lacking in perspicuity regarding the xed points’ explanatory role.
For example, while we are largely in agreement with Hüttemann et al. (2015), we
don’t think they go far enough in responding to the anti-reductionist challenge by
virtue of leaving the explanatory role of RG xed points unanalysed. And we see
little reason to analyse RG explanations simply as DN explanations, as Buttereld
(2011a, 2011b) and Norton (2012) do. It is against this context that we now aim to
do better.
3 The RG Explanandum
The RG framework furnishes a number of explanations regarding critical phe-
nomena. The rst order of business is to precisify the explanandum that we have
chosen to focus on: the universality of critical exponents. Making this explanan-
dum more precise contributes to addressing the ‘rst lacuna’ presented in the
introduction.
Critical phenomena involve continuous (second-order) phase transitions in
macroscopic systems near the critical point, where large-scale collective behaviour
becomes signicant. Standard examples of systems exhibiting critical phenomena
include liquid-vapour and magnets. Dynamically generated collective behaviour
is quantied by the correlation length, characterising the scale at which a collec-
tive behaviour is observed. At the critical point the correlation length diverges
(in the models of critical phenomena), indicating that near this point it becomes
very large, capturing system-wide macroscopic properties. Near the critical point
macroscopic, thermodynamic properties obey characteristic power laws as a func-
tion of reduced temperature t, proportional to the distance from critical tempera-
ture: t = t−tctc . It is remarkable that micro-physically very dierent systems, such
as liquid-vapour and ferromagnets, can have similar power laws, with identical
critical exponents. This is an instance of the kind of universality that comprises
the explanandum at stake.
Consider, for example, the scaling laws obeyed by ferromagnets, on the one
hand, and simple liquids, on the other. (Here we have magnetic susceptibility χ,
heat capacityCH , and magnetisationM ; compressibility κ, heat capacityCV , and
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liquid and gas densities ρl, ρg .)5
χ ∝ |t|−γ
CH ∝ |t|−α
M ∝ |t|β
κ ∝ |t|−γ
CV ∝ |t|α
(ρl − ρg) ∝ |t|β
It is crucial to be clear on the precise nature of universality in question. It is
not the case that all dierent systems exhibiting critical phenomena are exactly
similar in this way. Rather, simple liquid-vapour and ferromagnetic systems have
the same critical exponents by virtue of belonging to the same universality class
(viz. the ‘Ising class’, also containing the theoretical spin-1/2 Ising model). Other
universality classes describe systems with dierent critical exponents. In general,
a specic universality class, identied by its critical exponents, depends on the
following variables: spatial dimensionality, the symmetry of the order parameter
(also called the ‘spin dimensionality’), and the range of the microscopic interac-
tions. We will return to this central issue regarding what universality depends on
below.
The real explanandum of the RG analysis is this kind of curtailed universal-
ity, with systems falling within a relatively small number of distinct universality
classes. A blunt notion of universality – that micro-physically dierent systems
can obey power laws with identical critical exponents – is not at issue, as it can
be established by ‘classical’ (non-RG) methods of mean-eld theory and Landau,
and it indeed had already been established prior to the development of RG analysis
(see e.g. Als-Nielsen and Birgeneau, 1977; Kopietz et al. 2010, ch. 2). These classi-
cal methods yield estimates of critical exponents that do not fare well empirically,
however, and they failed to indicate the dependence of the critical exponents on
systems’ spatial dimensionality in particular. The celebrated explanatory contri-
bution of the RG analysis must be appreciated and understood in this (pre-RG)
theoretical context. This is something that many expositions of the RG analysis
emphasise quite explicitly:
The starting point is mean eld theory which allows us to describe
phase transitions and explore the neighbourhood of the critical tem-
perature. In the case of second order phase transitions, continuous
5The critical exponentsα, β, γ furthermore obey a simple (Rushbrooke) inequalityα+2β+γ ≥
2, showing that they are not independent from one another. This is another explanandum for the
RG framework.
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phase transitions where the correlation length diverges, this leads to
the concept of super-universality. The latter is summarized in Lan-
dau’s theory of critical phenomena. A number of quantities, like the
exponents which characterize the singular behaviour of physical ob-
servables near the critical temperature, are universal, i.e. indepen-
dent of the system (provided it has only short range interactions),
and even the dimensions of space. However, empirical evidence, ex-
act solutions of 2D models, and nally an analysis of corrections to
mean eld theory, had shown that a universality of such general na-
ture could not be true. [. . . ] The existence of even a more restricted
universality was puzzling. It took many years to develop the [RG]
which explains the origin of universality: it relies on the existence of
IR xed points of RG transformations. (Zinn-Justin, 2006, 218)
What we are emphasising here, along with Zinn-Justin, is the fact that in the
pre-RG context of mean eld and Landau theories what really needed explaining
was not universality per se – how microscopically very dierent systems could be
similar in their macro properties – but the observed dependence of critical expo-
nents and universality classes on the systems’ spatial dimensions and the other
features that carve the nature into these ‘universality kinds’. So, the question was:
how does it follow from the laws of statistical mechanics, including the dynamical
laws and the partition function connecting the micro- and macro-levels, that the
properties exhibiting universality depend on the variables outlined above. The
explanatory contribution of the RG analysis has been to answer this question by
deriving the values of the critical exponents for large classes of Hamiltonians in
a way that brings out the explanatory dependencies as their logico-mathematical
consequence for systems of suciently many components.6 Furthermore, this
framework provides an understanding of the nature of the dependence in ques-
tion as a collective probabilistic matter, having to do with the way in which chancy
uctuations across a huge range of scales relate and contribute to the macroscopic
properties.7
6One should not overplay the rigour and precision here: due to the level of abstraction and
mathematical intractability, RG ‘derivations’ involve various approximation schemes and plausibil-
ity considerations, yielding approximate values for the measured critical exponents.
7Ignoring the importance of uctuations is where the mean eld theoretical approaches to crit-
ical phenomena go wrong. This is particularly critical for systems with the spatial dimensionality
below ‘upper critical dimensionality’, which is typically 4. It can be shown that for systems of larger
dimensionality mean eld theories, despite their crude approximations, yield the correct universal
critical exponents.
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4 The RG Explanans
In this section, we will reconstruct the relevant physics of the explanans of RG
explanations in detail (§4.1). Then, in response to the ‘second lacuna’ presented in
the introduction, we will suggest that the counterfactual dependence account of
explanation nicely captures the explanatory character of RG explanations (§4.2).
4.1 The Physics of the RG Explanans
After some preliminaries (in subsection (a)), we will focus on: (b) the sense of
coarse-graining associated with the renormalisation operation; (c) the notion of
xed-point of the renormalisation operation and its explanatory role; and (d) the
notion of universality class of Hamiltonians.
(a) Preliminaries. An RG analysis of collective behaviour near criticality brings
out a network of dependencies between the critical exponents, on the one hand,
and (i) spatial dimensionality, (ii) the dimensionality of the spin parameter, and
(iii) certain qualitative features of the Hamiltonians that characterise systems
micro-physically, on the other.8 An RG analysis explains by showing how the
critical exponents, viz. the explanandum, depends on (i)-(iii), and how this net-
work of dependencies mathematically follows from statistical mechanics. The
RG framework accomplishes this by various means. First, there are extremely
general RG analyses that treat spatial dimensionality and the dimensionality of
the spin parameter as variables, and determine how RG xed points depend on
these variables. (e.g. Zinn-Justin, 2007) Second, there are more circumscribed RG
analyses of specic classes of Hamiltonians, regarding systems of specic spatial
dimensions and spin parameters. We will focus on the latter.
Recall that a Hamiltonian, or energy function, characterizes the energy of the
interactions between the system’s components, and also the energetic eect of
8This set of dependencies is unlike those represented by the ideal gas law, for instance, in that
the explanans variables cannot be grasped independently of the microlevel description. Even spatial
dimensionality has to be understood in a particular way, as it matters only insofar as it tracks the
connectivity of systems’ elementary degrees of freedom. For example, a three-dimensional ‘magnet’
made of eectively two dimensional slabs, the spins of which do not interact across the slabs, does
not count as three dimensional in this respect. Similarly, an anisotropic d-dimensional lattice where
the energy parameters connecting the lattice points in the direction of one axis tend to zero is, from
the point of the connectivity of elementary degrees of freedom, eectively (d−1)-dimensional. The
relevance of spatial dimensionality can be qualitatively understood in probabilistic terms. Classical,
pre-RG approaches of critical phenomena underestimate the importance of statistical uctuations,
the probability of which increases along with spatial dimensionality (see e.g. Stanley, 1999, 365).
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the external conditions (e.g. magnetic eld) on the system. For example, for a
very simple spin-1/2 Ising model, the Hamiltonian function is given by
H = −J
∑
<ij>
SiSj − h
∑
i
Si (1)
Here Si is the ‘spin’ parameter (Si = ±1) ranging over all lattice sites; the
rst summation is over all interacting pairs of spins, and the coupling constant
J gives the interaction energy. The energetic contribution of an external mag-
netic eld is represented by h. The lattice of spins can be a 1-dimensional string,
2-dimensional square lattice, 3-dimensional cubic lattice, or (more abstractly) d-
dimensional hyper-cubic lattice.
For this class of models, the spin parameter Si has only one component, and
the model has global Z2 symmetry: in the absence of an external magnetic eld
the Hamiltonian is invariant under Si → −Si (∀i). We can enlarge the set of pos-
sible interactions by allowing the spin parameter to have further possible values,
and/or more components. For instance, in spin-1 Ising models Si ∈ {1, 0,−1},
and in q-state Potts models Si ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , q}. The spin parameter can also
be a vector, instead of scalar. For example, in XY-models the spin parameter has
two components, Si = (Sxi , S
y
i ), and in n-vector models Si has n components.
Changes in these features of the spin parameter can change the symmetry of the
Hamiltonian (depending on how it has been dened in terms of the various spin-
spin interactions), resulting in dierent critical exponents.
The dependence of the critical exponent on spatial dimensionality and the di-
mensionality of the spin parameter can be studied by RG analyses of specic mod-
els, involving specic (classes of) Hamiltonians, and specic spatial dimensions
and spin parameters. Such model-specic RG analyses collectively contribute
to showing how critical exponents depend on the specic dimensionalities and
symmetries. One can, for example, compare the results of RG analyses of two-
dimensional vs. three-dimensional spin-1/2 Ising models. Or one can compare
RG analyses of n-dimensional spin-1/2 vs. spin-1 models. In the context of these
models one can furthermore show that a specic Hamiltonian is not responsible
for the value of the critical exponent, since there is much leeway in the exact
form of the Hamiltonian, as long as the essential parameters – spatial dimension-
ality and dimensionality of the spin parameter – are kept xed. This establishes
a local universality in relation to such specic models: critical phenomena are
independent of the details of the original microscopic interaction, since the spe-
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cic modelling Hamiltonian can be perturbed without changing the features that
factor into the calculation of critical exponents.9
(b) Coarse-graining and renormalisation. More generally, RG analyses show
that the dierent Hamiltonians in a given universality class are similar in that
they exhibit similar collective behaviors under sucient ‘coarse-graining’: when
it comes to long-distance physics near the critical point, the dierences in the
microphysical couplings wash out. The sense in which the dierent Hamiltoni-
ans are similar in this way is provided in terms of mathematical renormalization
group (RG) transformations. The behaviour of Hamiltonians under iterated RG
transformations can be used to determine the critical exponents near the criti-
cal point, as we will presently explain. Roughly speaking, universality with re-
spect to variation in the specic Hamiltonian then follows from dierent systems’
similarity in this respect, and the RG analysis provides a sense in which a given
universality class depends on the Hamiltonians in that class having this feature
(in addition to depending on spatial dimensionality and the dimensionality of the
spin parameter).
In order to esh out this sketch, and to pinpoint the role played by RG xed
points in nding out about this dependence, we now present a schematic outline
of an RG analysis.10 The gist of the (very broadly applicable) RG framework is
to explore ways of re-expressing – ‘renormalizing’ – a set of relevant modelling
parameters in terms of another (possibly simpler) set of parameters, and then
rescaling the system, in a way that keeps unchanged some physical aspects of
interest. In the context of critical phenomena, a renormalization transformation
amounts to the coarse-graining of the short-distance degrees of freedom, while
keeping a system’s long-distance physics xed.11 This is achieved, in particular,
9There are limits how much a Hamiltonian can be changed without aecting critical phenomena.
It matters, in particular, how short/long-range the micro-interactions are. Again, this can be studied
by case-specic models, looking e.g. at spin-1/2 Ising models for interaction
H = −J
∑
<ij>
1
rωij
SiSj
as a function of ω, with rij the distance between lattice sites i, j (e.g. Cannas, 1995).
10We only provide a schematic presentation of the key concepts involved in an RG analysis;
for further details see e.g. Fisher (1983, 1998), Wilson (1983), Cardy (1996), McComb (2004), Zinn-
Justin (2007), Sethna (2006), Pathria and Beale (2009), Nishimori and Ortiz (2010). Our presentation
is mostly drawn from the Nishimori and Ortiz (2010). See also Appendix for further details.
11Much of the ingenuity in the development of the RG framework has gone into techniques that
can be used to implement with sucient rigour this kind of coarse-graining (e.g. real-space RG,
momentum space RG, Monte Carlo RG).
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by ensuring that the partition function is left intact by the re-parametrisation.
The RG analysis operates on a large (possibly innitely dimensional) abstract
space of possible ‘models’, or parameters, with a dierent dimension for each
possible parameter of the Hamiltonian (e.g. couplings between immediate neigh-
bours, next-neighbours, etc.), as well as for each ‘control’ parameter that can be
tuned in an experiment (e.g. temperature, external magnetic eld, chemical com-
position, etc.). The RG framework studies the way in which this high-dimensional
space of parameters maps into itself under a renormalization operation Rb of the
relevant parameters: u′ = Rb(u).12 Iteration of the renormalization operation in-
duces a ‘ow’ in the parameter space, whereby a ‘model’ u, specied by particular
parameter values, gets mapped to a dierent point u′.
u→ Rb(u)→ R2b(u)→ · · · → Rnb (u)→ · · ·
Analysing the structure of such ow in the space of parameters is the essence
of the RG analysis: it qualitatively explains why the long-distance physics (espe-
cially with respect to scaling laws) for microscopically dierent systems S1, S2,
S3,. . . is similar near their respective critical points, and it quantitatively allows for
a calculation of critical exponents. (We will focus on the qualitative explanation
below. See Appendix for comments on the quantitative aspects.)
A rough idea of qualitative RG understanding of universality near critical-
ity can be given as follows. Let’s assume that two Hamiltonians H1 and H2 in
the space of parameters display similar ow behaviour and end up close to one
another under repeated RG transformations; viz. the physics captured by those
Hamiltonians can be modelled, at a suciently coarse-grained level, by eective
Hamiltonians that are close to one another in the space of parameters. Then the
two systems captured by H1 and H2 have a similar long-distance behaviour. It is
an extraordinary fact that large classes of possible systems (viz. classes of possible
Hamiltonians) in this way lead to similar long-distance behaviour near critical-
ity. The RG analysis brings out this fact by revealing broad structural features
exhibited by RG ows in the space of parameters. It is here that an indispensable
theoretical role is played by the xed points of RG ows.
12Rb is associated with a scaling factor b, which determines the rescaling of the system’s length
scale by 1/b. A generic Hamiltonian is written as the sum of products of parameters un and ‘op-
erators’ (viz. microscopic degrees of freedom) On: H =
∑
n unOn =
∑
n u · O. For example,
in equation (1) the coupling constants J and h are parameters, and SiSj and Si are operators.
Renormalisation transformations form a semi-group: u′′ = Rb2(u′) = Rb2Rb1(u) = Rb1b2(u).
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(c) Fixed-points. A xed point u∗ (in the space of parameters) is dened as a
point (or more generally, a sub-manifold) that gets mapped to itself under renor-
malization, thereby terminating the RG ow (since further RG transformations
do not ow to a dierent point): u∗ = Rb(u∗). Prima facie, it seems possible
that RG ows might exhibit wildly unstable, even chaotic behaviour, indicating
very ne-tuned dependence of a system’s large-scale behaviour on its microscopic
couplings. It turns out that this isn’t so (at least for very large classes of Hamilto-
nians of interest): instead, in the space of parameters there are points – the xed
points of RG transformations – towards which RG ows are ‘attracted’. There is
thus much structure and regularity to the way in which dierent Hamiltonians
‘coarse-grain’ so as to give rise to similar macroscopic properties. In particular,
under repeated RG transformations the eective, coarse-grained Hamiltonians
‘gravitate’ close to a xed point, as long as the starting point of the iterated RG
transformations – xed by an original microphysical Hamiltonian and some given
values of the control parameters – is suciently close to a broad basin of attrac-
tion of the xed point. RG xed points and their associated basins of attraction
thus give the abstract space of parameters an interesting topological structure.
The theoretical resources involving the xed points and their basins of attrac-
tion are indispensable (in the current state of physics at least) for grasping this
topological structure exhibited by the space of parameters, and for studying its
repercussions on those models that, from the perspective of the more fundamen-
tal theory, can be taken to faithfully represent a system of interest approaching a
critical point. When universal scaling phenomena is demonstrated and measured
in the laboratory, it concerns (from the reductionist perspective, at least) nite
systems. Not all points in the abstract space of parameters correspond to these
nite systems: for the points at criticality, in particular, the correlation length ξ
diverges, in blatant contradiction with the nitude of the actual systems of in-
terest. Thus, for the reductionist these points are best construed as mathematical
approximations of properties of sequences of corresponding nite models, having
these points as limits (cf. Norton 2012).
Under renormalization the correlation length transforms as ξ[u′] = b−1ξ[u]
due to rescaling by factor b. Thereby the RG ow is away from criticality upon
each successive operation of Rb, assuming ξ is nite to begin with (see Figure 1).
Therefore, in order for the renormalisation ow to terminate, a xed point must
have a divergent correlation length (critical xed point), or else it must vanish
(trivial xed point). Clearly the correlation length must also be divergent for all
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the points in the basin of attraction of a critical xed point. This basin is the critical
manifold. The points in the parameter space that correspond to nite models are
not on this manifold – they do not ow to a (critical) xed point under RG transfor-
mations. Rather, the basin of attraction of a (critical) xed point comprises points
in the space of parameters which are at criticality, featuring control parameters
(e.g. temperature, or external magnetic eld) that have been taken to the critical
point in the corresponding phase space. Since the correlation length diverges at a
(critical) xed-point and everywhere on its associated critical manifold, and since
the correlation length cannot diverge without taking a thermodynamic limit, the
latter is needed to connect statistical mechanics to the RG xed point.
For concreteness’ sake, consider a trajectory in the abstract space of mod-
els, induced by smoothly changing one of the control parameters, t. (See gure
1.) This ‘physical line’ captures how a system modelled by a given Hamiltonian
changes as the control parameter moves ever closer to the critical point Tc, where
the correlation length diverges. This point Tc is sometimes called the ‘physical
critical point’, but one shouldn’t read too much into this label: a reductionist takes
the divergence of the correlation length to indicate, of course, that this point in
the space of parameters is at best an idealisation of the nite physical system, or
perhaps merely a vehicle for approximating some of the properties represented by
the points outside of criticality T < Tc. This ‘physical line’ in the space of models
is not an RG ow, and the changing macroscopic properties of a system that tracks
such trajectory can be measured in the laboratory, e.g. when critical indices are
measured. But these macroscopic changes along a physical line cannot be stud-
ied theoretically due to the intractability of the huge number of correlations and
interactions at dierent scales due to uctuations near criticality.
The RG framework deals with this intractability by renormalizing the relevant
modelling parameters, yielding more and more coarse-grained eective models in
a way that keeps the macroscopic physics unchanged. Any point on the ‘physical
line’ can be taken as the starting point of iterated RG transformations, which in-
duce a corresponding ow in the space of models. Unlike the ‘physical line’, these
ows do not correspond to any physical change of the system, but rather capture
equivalence classes of models that share the same long-distance physics. Of all the
points on the physical line, the ‘physical critical point’ is special, since it (and only
it) ows to a (critical) xed point upon successive iterations of the renormalization
transformation. (That is, this point belongs to the critical manifold.)
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Figure 1: Schematic depiction of RG ow. The thicker, straight line through the
‘physical critical point’ h,tc is the ‘physical line’.
(d) Universality classes of Hamiltonians. Although the basin of attraction
only comprises points in the critical manifold, there is also a broader RG ow
towards (although not into) a critical xed point, exhibited by points outside the
critical manifold. (Cf. Figure 1.) That is, a ow emanating from a point that is
suciently close to a basin of attraction will end up in the vicinity of the critical
xed point after some nite number of renormalisation transformations, before
veering away from it towards a trivial xed point. In particular, systems modelled
by dierent o-critical parameters in the ‘critical domain’ – the neighbourhood
of a critical point where correlation length is very large with respect to the mi-
croscopic scale – will end up owing close enough to the critical xed point for
the ow to be examined in terms of linearised RG. This examination formally re-
veals the aspects of the parameter space that are relevant for the value of critical
exponents, as well as the aspects that are irrelevant, in the sense that change in
the irrelevant parameters is inconsequential to the value of critical exponents.
(See Appendix for details.) Systems with dierent Hamiltonians that only dier
in the irrelevant parameters therefore exhibit the same long-distance behaviour
near their critical point. They belong to the same universality class.
With the distinction between relevant and irrelevant parameters we can cap-
ture an important mathematical fact about the behaviour of a large class of Hamil-
tonians under a given renormalization transformation. Once we x the laws of
statistical physics and an appropriate renormalisation transformation, the fact
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that two systems A and B are in the same universality class follows with mathe-
matical necessity. For a want of a better analogy, consider, for example, composi-
tion of forces. Assume that two dierent sets of force vectors {f1, f2} and {f3, f4}
result in the same total force f1 + f2 = F = f3 + f4. The fact that both sets are
similar in this way – they both belong to the same ‘universality’ class of compo-
nent vectors that add up to F – follows with mathematical necessity, once we x
the law of force composition. Similarly, a given universality class depends on its
Hamiltonians in the same way: the fact that two systems with dierent Hamilto-
nians only vary in the irrevant parameters follows with mathematical necessity,
once we x a renormalisation transformation.13
4.2 The Counterfactual Dependence Account of RG Explanations
Having summarised the key concepts of the RG explanans, let us now consider
the philosophical issue at stake in the second lacuna: which philosophical account
of explanation best captures RG explanations? We think a promising approach to
RG explanations is the counterfactual dependence account of scientic explana-
tion. This approach takes as its starting point the key idea behind Woodward’s
counterfactual account of causal explanation:
“An explanation ought to be such that it enables us to see what sort
of dierence it would have made for the explanandum if the factors
cited in the explanans had been dierent in various possible ways."
(Woodward 2003: 11)
Understanding explanatory relevance thus in terms of counterfactual dependence
is not necessarily tied to a causal interpretation. The basic idea can be extended
from causal to non-causal explanations, as Woodward himself indicates in terms
of “what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions":
13Some philosophers have classied this kind of dependence as clearly not causal, and RG expla-
nation as a kind of ‘non-causal’ explanation (this point has been elaborated by Lange 2009, 2013).
Lange’s notion of ‘distinctively mathematical’ explanations is one possible way of interpreting this
mathematical aspect of RG explanations. (Cf. Lange 2013) However, although we think that the
RG explanation is non-causal and mathematical, we disagree with Lange’s analysis of the explana-
toriness of these kinds of ‘distinctly mathematical’ explanations. As we will argue in Section 4.2,
one can also view this explanation from the perspective of counterfactual dependence account of
explanation, according to which it is the counterfactual dependences between the explanandum
and the explanans that drives the explanation, not the fact that the explanandum is mathematically
necessary given the explanans. (See also Jansson and Saatsi, forthcoming)
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“[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both causal
and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-had-been-
dierent questions." (Woodward 2003: 221)
Proponents of a counterfactual dependence account of explanation have devel-
oped and made precise the idea Woodward expresses. They hold that both causal
and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting how the ex-
planandum counterfactually depends on the explanans. The global motivation for
defending this approach to scientic explanation stems from its unicationist or
monist prospects – that is, it is attractive to have one single theory of explana-
tion for two types of explanation (causal and non-causal). In the recent literature,
the counterfactual dependence account of explanation has been articulated and
explored in application to various examples of non-causal explanations (Frisch
1998; Bokulich 2008; Kistler 2013; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Pexton 2014; Reutlinger
2016; Saatsi 2017; French and Saatsi forthcoming; Jansson and Saatsi forthcoming;
Woodward forthcoming).
We will now argue in more detail why we think the counterfactual depen-
dence account applies to RG explanations. To do so, we will focus on the core of
the account consisting of two necessary conditions for being a scientic expla-
nation (we follow the exposition in Reutlinger 2016). We ignore other necessary
conditions here on which proponents of this account of explanation dier.
First, the counterfactual dependence account requires that one can infer the
explanandum from the explanans (where this inference may be deductive or statistical-
inductive). In the case of RG explanations, this condition is satised because the
RG explanans (consisting of Hamiltonians and the theoretical framework of sta-
tistical mechanics, RG transformations, the determination of xed point, and so
on, as described in §4.1) deductively entails the RG explanandum. We take the sat-
isfaction of this condition to be the kernel of truth in Buttereld’s and Norton’s
claim that RG explanations are DN-explanations (see §2).
Second, the counterfactual dependence account also requires that the explanans
allows us to evaluate counterfactuals of the following form as true: “if some vari-
ables guring in the explanans had specic dierent values (which typically cor-
responds to assuming that the initial conditions of a physical system are dierent
than they actually are), then the explanandum phenomenon would also be dier-
ent in some specic way". RG explanations satisfy this condition, since the RG
explanans enables us to determine whether a physical system S would be in a dif-
ferent universality class, if certain features of S were dierent than they actually
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are. In other words, the RG explanans conveys what being in a specic univer-
sality class counterfactually depends on. For instance, the RG explanans supports
the following explanatorily relevant counterfactuals:
• If a physical system S had a dierent spatial dimensionality than it actually
has, then S would be in such-and-such a dierent universality class than it
actually is in.
• If a physical system S had a dierent symmetry of the order parameter than
it actually has, then S would be in such-and-such a dierent universality
class than it actually is in.
• If a physical system S had a (suciently) dierent range of the microscopic
interactions than it actually has, then S would be in such-and-such a dier-
ent universality class than it actually is in.
As we have seen in previous sections, it is a central purpose of the RG frame-
work to underwrite such conditionals. First, as discussed in Section 3, the key ex-
planandum regarding universality that was left outstanding in the pre-RG context
of mean eld and Landau theories, was the observed dependence of critical expo-
nents and universality classes on those features of the world that seem to carve
the nature into these broad kinds. Secondly, as discussed in detail in Section 4.1,
the RG framework provides the means to bring out the relevant dependencies, by
virtue of showing exactly how critical exponents depend on spatial dimensional-
ity, dimensionality of the spin parameter, and the range of micro-interactions.
Let us highlight the crucial point encoded in the two necessary conditions
of the counterfactual dependence account: the RG framework does not only de-
ductively entail that many physical systems with dierent original microphysical
Hamiltonians display the same macro-behavior (as required by the rst condi-
tion). In addition, the RG framework also provides a wealth of modal information
regarding what being in a specic universality class depends on (thereby satisfy-
ing the second necessary condition).
In sum, we take it that the counterfactual dependence account of explanation
has a good claim to capture the explanatory character of RG explanations (see
Reutlinger 2016 for an in-depth discussion). This addresses the ‘second lacuna’.
We are now in a position to use the assumption that the counterfactual depen-
dence account applies to RG explanations to rebut the anti-reductionist challenge.
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5 How to Meet the Anti-reductionist Challenge
Recall the anti-reductionist challenge motivated by the argument from innite
limits: to show how the xed points involved in RG explanations of critical phe-
nomena can be both (a) explanatorily indispensable and, at the same time, (b)
compatible with reductionism? How should the reductionist respond?
Our response, in the light of our analysis of the RG explanation, is to argue
that even if reference to xed points is indispensable for RG explanations, it plays
a merely instrumental role and does not lead to an ontological commitment in
tension with reductionism. This argument rebuts ontological anti-reductionism
of the sort most explicitly defended by Morrison (2012, 2015) in particular. At
the end of this section we will consider the residual issue of explanatory (anti-
)reductionism.
Let us now go through this argument in detail. To begin with, we grant the
anti-reductionists (at least for the sake of the argument) that reference to xed
points is indispensable for RG explanations of universality. Indeed, xed points
are in a profound sense at the heart of our best understanding of critical phenom-
ena, which in many ways turns on the classication of xed points and examina-
tion of their properties.
However, the actual physical systems of interest – being nite both spatially
and with respect to the number of microphysical components – cannot be repre-
sented by the xed point Hamiltonian itself, or the points on the critical manifold
for that matter, since the correlation length diverges for these points. But although
the xed point Hamiltonian cannot be taken to represent the nite target system,
reference to the xed point can be explanatorily indispensable. In particular, xed
points are instrumentally indispensable for nding out and expressing facts about
those ‘models’ in the space of parameters that lie in the critical domain but out-
side of criticality – facts that are explanatorily relevant for critical phenomena. It
is these o-critical ‘models’ that represent the features of the world on which the
critical exponents and universality classes depend, and RG analyses explain by
virtue of (and to the extent they succeed in) providing correct information about
such dependencies (see below).
Although xed points do not, in and of themselves, represent anything about
the nite systems exhibiting critical phenomena, reference to xed points is nev-
ertheless indispensable. There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, the RG
analysis provides a method for calculating the critical exponents through an anal-
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ysis of the nature of the RG ow in the neighbourhood of the xed point. Obvi-
ously, we cannot speak of the neighbourhood of a xed point without speaking
of the xed point itself, so analysing the structure of the equivalence classes of
Hamiltonians (viz. the RG ows) in the neighbourhood of the xed point naturally
involves a reference to the xed point (cf. §4.1 (c) and (d)). But here the reference
to the xed point is merely playing the role of determining that we are operating
in the critical domain where the correlation length is large enough with respect to
the microscopic scale for the linearised RG analysis to be valid. (See Appendix.)
This kind of reference to critical xed points in connection with specic models
is indispensable for doing the calculations that contribute to showing how the
critical exponents depend on the relevant explanatory parameters.
Secondly, reference to critical xed points is indispensable for expressing the
explanatorily relevant feature shared by all possible Hamiltonians in a given uni-
versality class. This is done by reference to the mathematical fact that upon renor-
malization they all end up in the vicinity of the same xed point, where their
further coarse-graining is similarly dependent only on a few relevant variables
(cf. §4.1 (d)). Although it is necessary to make reference to the xed point in ex-
pressing and theorising about this feature that the Hamiltonians share, one can
again adopt an instrumentalist attitude to the xed point itself, while using it to
express the explanatorily relevant feature regarding the physical Hamiltonians’
behaviour under coarse-graining.
If we thus grant that reference to xed points is indispensable, how do we
avoid an ontological commitment that is in tension with reductionism, and how
do we justify the claim that xed points are merely instrumentally indispensable?
Our response relies on the assumption that the counterfactual dependence ac-
count captures the explanatory character of the RG explanation. If this is correct,
then we naturally relate RG explanation’s ontological commitments with those
(and only those) variables on which the explanandum depends. Relative to the
framework of the counterfactual dependence account, we can draw a distinction
between those aspects of an explanation that feature in (or represent) explanatory
counterfactual dependence relations, on the one hand, and those aspects that play
some other role, e.g. in communicating or facilitating the explanation, on the
other. Given such a distinction, an explanation’s ontological commitments are
naturally associated with the former aspects. That is, only those factors on which
the explanandum counterfactually depends carry ontological import.
Much more has been said about this broad philosophical stance towards ex-
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planations’ realist commitments, e.g. in Saatsi (2016b), which provides a more
general analysis of explanatory indispensability with a view to distinguishing
between ontologically committing (‘thick’) and instrumental (‘thin’) explanato-
rily indispensable assumptions. According to Saatsi, the precise content of the
thin/thick distinction is relative to a given account of scientic explanation. Saatsi
then argues, in the context of dierent counterfactual dependence and modal ac-
counts of explanation, that the explanatory indispensability of mathematics is in-
sucient for ontological commitment to mathematics.14 (This satises the fairly
minimal veridicality criterion that Woodward and others have associated with
counterfactual dependence accounts: actual (as opposed to merely potential) ex-
planations should get right the explanatory modal facts. Yet at the same time it
leaves room for instrumentalism about explanations’ other aspects, regardless of
their ‘indispensability’ or otherwise.)
Hence, assumptions about RG xed points can be indispensable without being
ontologically committing in a way that poses a threat to reductionism, if the RG
explanandum does not counterfactually depend on the xed points. We will now
argue that this is the case.
In the light of the counterfactual dependence account of explanation, we see
that the RG explanation works by bringing out how the explanandum (viz. crit-
ical exponents) counterfactually depends on features such as the spatial dimen-
sionality, the symmetry of the order parameter, and the range of the microscopic
interactions. And these are all the explanatory dependencies involved in RG ex-
planations. In particular, there is no analogous counterfactual dependence of the
RG explanandum on the xed points. In the context of the RG explanations, a
xed point is simply not considered to be a ‘variable’, with dierent possible val-
ues, that we can associate, via RG transformations, with dierent possible states
of the explanandum variable. Instead, if one accepts that xed points are indis-
pensable for RG explanations of universality (as anti-reductionists do), then one
is committed to the claim that it is impossible to consider counterfactual varia-
tions of the relevant assumptions about xed points (for instance, through de-
idealization) without losing explanatory power. Indeed, everyone in the debate
agrees that it is not part of an RG explanation to exhibit what would happen if
the xed points were dierent.15 Similarly, it is not a part of RG explanations to li-
14In a similar spirit, Saatsi (2017) argues for an instrumentalist attitude towards ‘strange attrac-
tors’ and certain other mathematical features that are indispensable in explanations provided by
dynamical systems theory. See also Woodward (2003b).
15Note that we restrict this claim to RG explanations of universality of critical phenomena. Given
24
cense counterfactual assertions about what would happen if the laws of statistical
mechanics were dierent.
If this reasoning is sound, then the ontological reductionist is able to main-
tain an instrumentalist attitude towards RG xed points; reference to them in
the RG explanations of universality does not have an ontological commitment.
In particular, the kind of explanatory indispensability at stake does not suggest
any ontological commitment to facts that are beyond the domain of statistical
mechanics.
Admittedly, there is still room here for an explanatory anti-reductionist to
protest that we haven’t given a full reductionist story, purely in terms of the ‘nuts
and bolts’ of the micro-constituents and their interactions, why in the rst place
the mathematical space of parameters has an interesting topological structure
shaped by the xed points and critical surfaces.16 This raises deep issues that
require not only a solid grasp of the nature of RG explanations, but also a careful
analysis of the nature of explanatory (anti-)reductionism itself. What exactly does
it take to underwrite, purely in terms of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the reducing the-
ory, an explanatory use of novel theoretical concepts like RG xed points? What
exactly is the explanatory anti-reductionist (thus construed) asking from the re-
ductionist? These issues require further work, but in our view there is a real risk
that explanatory irreducibility turns out to be a thesis that is so undeniable and
widespread that it seriously reduces the interest of specic considerations turn-
ing on RG explanations of universality. For instance, consider a popular example
from the current literature on explanation: Koenigsberg’s bridges’ property of
being non-Eulerian. This is a novel theoretical concept that is explanatorily in-
dispensable (with respect to the bridges’ traversibility), and it is not at all clear
how we could hope to give a full reductionist account of the property of being
non-Eulerian, purely in terms of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the physics that describes
the bridges at the microlevel.17 If one takes this as an argument for some kind
of explanatory anti-reductionism, then some kind explanatory anti-reductionism
the extremely broad-ranging applicability of RG methods in statistical physics and quantum eld
theory, we consider it an open question whether there are other RG theories which underwrite
explanatory counterfactuals with an RG xed-point as a variable, such that they cannot be thought
of as capturing an explanatory dependence of the explanandum in question on features of nite
physical systems in the vicinity of the xed-point.
16We appreciate an anonymous referee pressing us on this.
17A connected graph G is Eulerian i every vertex has an even degree. In connection with
this now well worn example the philosophical discussion has taken an explicitly ontological turn
(e.g. Pincock 2007). Indeed, explanatory anti-reductionism is more or less taken as for granted, the
only issue of real interest being ontological.
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seems undeniable given how quickly examples of this sort multiply, and it is no
longer clear what particular contribution is made by the RG explanation of uni-
versality.
6 Conclusion
We have provided a strategy for meeting the anti-reductionist challenge and for
rebutting the argument for ontological anti-reductionism from innite limits in
the context of RG explanations of universality. This strategy is broadly in agree-
ment with Norton’s metaphor of xed points as a ‘mathematical peg’, and also
with Menon and Callender (2013). But we think it is critical that an analysis of
the explanatory role of xed points is properly couched in the context of a tting
philosophical account of the explanation at stake. In as far as the counterfactual
dependence account of explanation provides a tting account, a reductionist can
happily admit the explanatory indispensability of the limits involved in RG xed
points.
The challenge of explanatory anti-reductionism, raised by Batterman in par-
ticular, requires more discussion than we are able to provide here. In our view the
issue at stake is clouded by the current lack of clarity as to the exact nature of ex-
planatory anti-reductionism – this is why we have chosen to focus on an explicitly
ontological construal of the anti-reductionist challenge. For example, Menon and
Callender (2013, 210) characterise explanatory irreducibility, reasonably, as taking
place “when the explanation of a higher-level phenomenon requires a conceptual
novelty, yet the reducing theory does not have the resources to explain why the
conceptual novelty is warranted.” In the context of the RG explanation of uni-
versality the question then is whether or not the more fundamental theory has
the resources to explain why the explanatory appeal to xed points and critical
surfaces of RG space is warranted. As discussed at the end of the previous section,
it is not clear to us what this question amounts to exactly – what is being asked
by way of providing reductionist warrant for novel theoretical concepts. But we
do maintain that this question cannot be answered without taking properly into
account the nature of the RG explanation, and the preceding analysis contributes
to this task. To recall, we claim to have shown how the reductionist can under-
stand how RG xed points and critical surfaces are instrumental in approximating
aspects of nite physical systems near criticality, and how they function as indis-
pensable instruments in bringing out explanatory dependencies between physical
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variables. But their explanatory indispensability notwithstanding, the reduction-
ist can consistently maintain that the xed points and critical surfaces do not
represent anything at all in the nite systems that exhibit universality.
Appendix: Linearised RG
In the vicinity of the xed point RG transformations can be linearised in a way that
supports the distinction between relevant and irrelevant parameter (e.g. Nishi-
mori and Ortiz (2010). (Linearised RG analysis also supports quantitative calcula-
tion of critical exponents.)
Consider a renormalization transformation fromu tou′ = Rb(u) in the vicin-
ity of the xed point. Writing these two points in terms of small deviations from
the xed point we have u = u∗ + δu, and u′ = u∗ + δu′. In the neighbourhood
of the xed point Rb(u) can be expanded to rst order:
u′ = u∗ + δu′ = Rb(u∗ + δu) = Rb(u∗) +
∂Rb
∂u
|u∗ · u+ · · ·
This yields a linearised renormalization equation
δu′ = Tb(u∗) · δu
where Tb(u∗) is a matrix with components
[Tb(u
∗)]ij =
∂u′i
∂uj
|u∗
It turns out that critical exponents can be calculated from the eigenvalues {λi}
and eigenvectors {φi} of this linear transformation Tb. The small deviations from
the xed point, δu and δu′ can be written as:
u = u∗ +
∑
i
giφi, u
′ = u∗ +
∑
i
g′iφi
where gi are the scaling variables that characterise the properties of the parameter
space near the xed point. An eigenvalue can be expressed as a power of the
rescaling factor b, as
λi(b) = b
yi
where the exponent yi characterises the parameter ow near the xed point. Re-
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markably, critical phenomena can be determined from these exponents and the
scaling variables.
In the vicinity of the xed point u∗, where the linearised RG theory is valid,
the nature of the parameter space is characterised by the scaling variables gi, as
well as the exponents yi (associated with the eigenvalues λi). In relation to the
local axes given by φi, the scaling variables identify certain directions of the pa-
rameter space as relevant for its critical behaviour: namely, the directions of the
eigenvectors φi for which yi > 0. The scaling variables in these directions are
the relevant variables. The scaling variables with negative exponents (yi < 0)
are irrelevant, and the variables with yi = 0 are marginal. Critical xed points
must have both relevant and irrelevant scaling variables in order to be associ-
ated with phase-transitions and critical points: the critical manifold is spanned
by the eigenvectors associated with the irrelevant scaling variables, forming the
basin of attraction of the xed point. The relevant scaling variables can in turn be
identied with the control parameters, the tuning of which is relevant to critical
phenomena (e.g. t and h in magnetic systems).
This distinction between relevant and irrelevant scaling variables delineates
the explanatorily critical features of non-renormalised, physical Hamiltonians –
the features on which the critical exponents depend. The critical exponents de-
pend only on the relevant variables, in the following sense. In the vicinity of
the xed point the relevance of these variables amounts to the fact that the RG
ow veers away from the xed point, in directions that are “orthogonal” to the
critical manifold. A universality class depends on the way in which RG ows
from dierent starting points (dierent physical Hamiltonians) are similar in this
way. (See e.g. Pathria and Beale, 2009. p. 436 .) The irrelevance of the irrele-
vant variables, on the other hand, amounts to the fact that in the vicinity of the
xed point changes in the irrelevant variables do not determine a system’s scaling
properties under coarse-graining; only changes in the relevant variables matter.
The only explanatory relevance that we can associate with the irrelevant vari-
ables turns on the fact that systems that dier only in the irrelevant variables,
within a given universality class, are similar the sense that their coarse-grained
descriptions asymptotically coincide: if the relevant scaling variables vanish –
viz. if the relevant control parameters are tuned to criticality – then any change
in the remaining, irrelevant parameters is immaterial to the large-distance prop-
erties, since iterated renormalisation of any Hamiltonian on the critical manifold
ows to the same critical xed point.
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